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Introduction
Compliance with fisheries regulations is in part, complicated as a result of the
current resource allocation regime between the federal government and the individual
states. Maritime boundaries delimit areas of state waters extending a certain distance
offshore with the remainder under federal control. Fisheries are managed with respect to
these separate jurisdictions and while state and federal interactions have led to various
combinations of authority with respect to management plans, authority over a fishery is
generally vested according to territorial sovereignty. Consequently, cognizance of
differing state and federal regulations and their applicable locales is of particular
importance to fishing vessel operators. A striped bass in state waters remains blissfully
unaware of its new federal designation after crossing an invisible line drawn over the
water, but a fisherman in pursuit who remains unaware soon runs afoul of federal
enforcement.
This paper examines state and federal fisheries jurisdictions in the context of
regulatory compliance in areas of complex maritime territorial boundaries. That both
states and the federal government independently regulate their fisheries is uncontroversial
for states with relatively featureless coastlines. In those instances, the boundary between
the two territories is a relatively straight line posing little risk for accidental or necessary
transit. Complex coastlines however, whether the result of deep coastal indentations or
offshore islands, isolate pockets of territory and create ample opportunity for a fishing
vessel operator to run afoul of incongruent state and federal regulations. For example,
Block Island sits more than six miles off the Rhode Island mainland. Because the state
has a three-mile territorial sea, the placement results in two areas of Rhode Island waters,
one wholly removed from the other by a narrow band of federal territory. Block Island’s
popularity among the fishing community combined with its sequestered nature makes
Block Island Sound an apt case study of the problems arising from a regime comprised of
dual state and federal fisheries jurisdictions.
Part I of this paper considers the issue of a federally licensed1 fishing vessel
transiting a state’s territorial waters. That this occurs is unsurprising considering the
necessity of returning to port to offload the catch. However, state regulations pertaining
to the catch on board are often more restrictive than their federal counterparts. The
question becomes whether the transit of state waters is legal when the catch on board
does not satisfy these more restrictive regulations. The answer is in the negative, as
federal fisheries regulations do not preempt those of the state unless the vessel is
unregistered in the state and fished wholly outside its waters. The same vessel now
transiting state waters to reach adjacent federal waters encounters fewer roadblocks; state
transit provisions allow the vessel to proceed provided gear remains stowed and passage
is continuous and expeditious.
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Note that there is no federal “fishing license.” Permits are sought a per species basis,
sometimes including multiple species of similar characteristics. To effectuate a general
discussion, “licensed” will refer to a vessel with the necessary permit.
2

Part II examines the less frequent issue of a state licensed2 vessel transiting
federal waters. Few state licensed vessels could ever have legitimate purpose to venture
seaward into federal waters but on occasion, offshore islands create “bubbles” of state
waters within which the vessels may fish. The issue becomes the legality of the return trip
across federal waters. The result is bifurcated; commercial vessels are barred from
returning while recreational vessels may transit the federal waters under certain
conditions. The commercial vessel is barred as a result of strict federal commercial
permit requirements. The reverse of the “most restrictive rule” in Part I governs
recreational vessels. Lacking the strict requirements, the recreational vessel may transit
federal waters provided that the catch on board satisfies federal regulations more
restrictive than those of the state.
Part III discusses the ability of a state to exercise fisheries jurisdiction over a
portion of federal waters to alleviate the incongruous fisheries management schemes
described in Part II. Massachusetts exercises fisheries jurisdiction over the federal waters
within Nantucket Sound under the justification that state management of fisheries in
federal waters is proper where state waters nearly or totally encompass federal waters.
This part discusses whether the application of this rule could extend to Block Island
Sound and concludes that while the geography is dissimilar, the problems raised are
worse, offering a more compelling reason to extend jurisdiction. While legislation could
provide for transit on a species-specific basis, a total extension of jurisdiction would be
more efficient.
Part IV describes a broader solution to fisheries problems; state annexation of
federal territory. While Massachusetts solved its fisheries issues in Nantucket sound
through an extension of fisheries jurisdiction, New York accomplished the same in Long
Island Sound through an extension of sovereignty. The issue here is whether Rhode
Island could classify Block Island Sound as the state’s internal waters, eliminating the
problematic federal waters. While Block Island Sound possesses all the necessary
characteristics of a “juridical bay,” the Supreme Court previously held that the while
Long Island Sound is a bay, Block Island Sound is not.3 Rhode Island’s burden is to show
that the Court’s subsidiary tests for defining a bay are unnecessary and arbitrary in light
of current treaty law.
I. Federal Permit – State Waters
A fishing vessel operating under a federal permit may legally transit state waters
in order to return to port or reach adjacent waters. To return to port, the vessel must abide
by any state regulation more restrictive than those applicable to federal fisheries. If
merely seeking adjacent federal waters, the vessel may proceed in accordance with state
mandated transit requirements. At issue in this part are the legal justifications for
subjecting a federally licensed vessel to state law rather than acknowledging the
supremacy of federal law and preempting state fisheries regulations.
2

State saltwater fishing licenses generally cover a broad array of species.
See U.S. v. Maine (The Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case), 469 U.S. 504
(1985).
3
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State control over coastal waters is a product of a settlement between the
individual states and the federal government. The resulting regime grants the territory a
certain distance offshore to the individual states with the remainder left to the federal
government. Specifically, states retain jurisdiction over the waters and marine resources
three nautical miles beyond their coastlines under the Submerged Lands Act and the
Outer Continental Shelf Act.4 This system of allocating marine resources between the
federal government and coastal states provides the basis for state and federal fisheries
management.
The Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act
(“Magnuson Act”) grants the United States control over fishing activities and fishery
resources within its waters.5 Specifically, the United States exerts regulatory and
enforcement powers over a radius extending 200 miles from the coastline.6 With respect
to the settlement between the federal government and the states, the landward boundary
of the area "[for the purpose] of applying [the Magnuson Act]… is a line coterminous
with the seaward boundary of each of the coastal States.”7 In further deference to the
states, the Magnuson Act also states, “Nothing in this Act shall be construed as extending
or diminishing the jurisdiction or authority of any State within its boundaries.”8
Neither § 1802(11) nor § 1856(a)(1) explicitly provides individual States
authority over federally licensed vessels but Congressional hearings on the authorization
of the Magnuson Act suggest that this was the result intended:
Under United States law, the biological resources within the territorial sea
of the United States are the management responsibility of the adjacent
several States of the Union. Whatever regulation of both fishermen and
fish harvest, what occurs in this area is as deemed necessary and
appropriate by each concerned State.9
Taken together, the intent and language of the Magnuson Act suggest that a state does
have regulatory authority over any fishing vessels that enter its waters. In plain evidence
of this interpretation, the language of the “most restrictive rule” appears in many federal
fisheries regulations.10
Opponents of the most restrictive rule argue that possession of a federal permit
allows a fishing vessel to disregard state management measures given the supremacy of
4

Submerged Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-31, 67 Stat. 29 (1953); Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act, Pub. L. No. 83-212, 67 Stat. 462 (1953).
5
16 U.S.C.S §§ 1801 et seq. (LexisNexis 2013).
6
16 U.S.C.S §§ 1853(c); 1855(d) (LexisNexis 2013).
7
16 U.S.C.S § 1802(11) (LexisNexis 2013).
8
16 U.S.C.S. § 1856(a)(1) (LexisNexis 2013).
9
H.R. Rep. No. 445, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 29 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
593, 602.
10
50 C.F.R. § 648.3 (2013) (Relation to Other Laws; Fisheries of the Northeastern United
States); (Nothing in these regulations supersedes more restrictive state management
measures for any of the species referenced in § 648.1 and, for Atlantic salmon, more
restrictive local management measures).
4

federal law and that consequently, federal fisheries regulations preempt those of the state.
Based on the language of the Magnuson Act, its legislative history, and
acknowledgement within federal regulations, it would appear settled that there is no
federal-state conflict. However, courts disagree whether the Magnuson Act and its
implementing regulations preempt state fisheries law.11
Rhode Island courts do hold that the Magnuson Act preempts state fisheries
regulations in certain situations. For instance in State v. Sterling, a Rhode Island
regulation established a catch limit of yellowtail flounder landed at Rhode Island ports or
possessed in Rhode Island territorial waters regardless of origin.12 State environmental
police found the defendant fishing vessel operator in excess of the limit, who argued that
the regulation conflicted with federal law.13 The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
through the Magnuson Act, Congress preempted the states where federal regulations
existed for specific species.14 In this instance, federal regulations governing the fishing of
yellowtail flounder were in effect, thereby barring the state from indirectly regulating the
species outside its boundaries.15
The apparent contradiction between the Sterling decision and the Magnuson Act
arises from the court’s reading of 16 U.S.C.A. § 1856(a)(3), which explains the limited
circumstances a state can regulate a vessel outside of its waters.16 The court then applied
these requirements for extraterritorial jurisdiction to regulation of all vessels within its
waters, citing the indirect effect this has on a vessel’s activities outside of them. This is
likely a misreading of the statute, as § 1856(a) states that, “nothing in this chapter shall be
construed as extending or diminishing the jurisdiction or authority of any State within its
boundaries.” The explicit “nothing in this chapter” appears to indicate that any court’s
construction that another provision in fact does diminish the authority of the state to
regulate vessels entering its waters is entirely untenable. Moreover, the Sterling court’s
interpretation also would severely restrict a state's authority to regulate fishing off its
waters, contrary to the express purpose of the Magnuson Act.17
Raffield v. State espouses the more common reading of the law: that a vessel
submits to the state's jurisdiction by docking within its territorial limits.18 There, a fish
processor violated a Florida statute barring possession of redfish caught with a purse
11

See Jay M. Zitter, Annotation, Preemption of State and Local Regulations by
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act (16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801 to 1883),
31 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 337 (2008).
12
448 A.2d 785, 786 (R.I.1982).
13
Id.
14
Id. at 787.
15
Id.
16
A State may regulate a fishing vessel outside the boundaries of the State in the
following circumstances: (A) The fishing vessel is registered under the law of that State,
and (i) there is no fishery management plan or other applicable Federal fishing
regulations for the fishery in which the vessel is operating; or (ii) the State’s laws and
regulations are consistent with the fishery management plan and applicable Federal
fishing regulations for the fishery in which the vessel is operating.
17
16 U.S.C.S § 1801(b) (LexisNexis 2013).
18
565 So. 2d 704 (F.L 1990).
5

seine.19 The processor possessed a federal permit to catch red fish in federal waters in the
Gulf of Mexico and argued that federal law preempted the federal statute.20 The court
noted that by their own language, the federal regulations pertaining to red drum expressly
encouraged more restrictive state regulation.21 The rules’ preamble stated:
It is the intent of the Secretary to supplement the States' efforts to conserve
red drum. Therefore, the emergency rule does not supersede any State
landing laws which apply to red drum.22
In concurrence with the statement of intent, the actual federal rules for red drum
provided:
(a) Persons affected by these regulations should be aware that other
Federal and State statutes and regulations may apply to their
activities…(d) These regulations will not be construed to supersede any
State law which prohibits the landing or possession within the jurisdiction
of that State of any red drum.23
That federal regulations constitute a floor, not a ceiling to state fisheries regulations and
as such do not preempt state regulations is the view of the First Circuit. In Davrod Corp.
v. Coates, a Massachusetts regulation set a catch limit for the amount squid a “freezer
boat” could process and barred vessels with a length greater than 90 feet from fishing in
Massachusetts waters.24 Found in violation of both regulations, the vessel owner argued
federal law, namely, the Magnuson Act, preempted the state regulation.25 The court
dismissed this contention and held that section §1856(a), expressly provided regulatory
authority to the state of Massachusetts over its coastal waters.26
It follows then, that a federally licensed vessel would be subject to the regulatory
authority of the state merely by transiting state waters to reach adjacent federal waters.
Regardless, states generally allow passage provided that the vessel does not stop and the
vessel’s fishing gear is stowed. For example, Rhode Island regulations governing the cod
fishery state that “vessels in possession of a federal permit allowing the commercial
harvest of cod may also transit state waters in possession of cod . . . so long as all of the
fish harvesting gear on board the vessel is stowed while in state waters.”27 Transit
19

Id. at 705.
Id.
21
Id.
22
51 Fed. Reg. 23,553 (1986).
23
Id. at 23,554.
24
971 F.2d 778, 781 (1st Cir. 1992).
25
Id. at 785.
26
Id. at 786-787.
27
25-8-4 R.I. CODE R. § 7.22 (LexisNexis 2013) (Vessels in possession of a federal
permit allowing the commercial harvest of cod may also transit state waters in possession
of cod . . . so long as all of the fish harvesting gear on board the vessel is stowed while in
state waters).
20
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allowances are often both species and gear specific. For winter flounder, “fishing
harvesting gear” that is “stowed” means for a net that is stowed below deck, “it is located
below the main working deck from which the net is deployed and retrieved, the towing
wires, including the "leg" wires are detached from the net; and it is fan-folded (flaked)
and bound around its circumference.”28
A federally licensed fishing vessel operator should therefore be cognizant of more
restrictive Rhode Island regulations if the vessel is to land at a Rhode Island port. While
the Rhode Island Supreme Court has held otherwise, the holding appears to be a
misreading of the law and in contradiction to the suggestive precedent of other courts, the
plain language of the Magnuson Act, and the Magnuson Act’s implementing regulations.
Regardless, the same vessel operator may transit across intervening state waters provided
he abides by the state transit requirements pertaining to the catch on board the vessel.
II. State Permit – Federal Waters
A tangle of state and federal regulations results where federal waters sequester
areas of state waters that are popular fishing grounds. To illustrate: a fishing vessel
operating under a Rhode Island permit is perfectly capable of crossing the federal waters
dividing Block Island Sound with an empty hold in order to reach the state waters around
Block Island. The legal repercussions begin on the return trip, but largely depend on the
type of fishing activity. Because of the reciprocity between the United States and Rhode
Island pertaining to recreational saltwater licenses, the recreational vessel may navigate
unimpeded back across the federal waters of Block Island Sound to the mainland.
Commercial vessels operating under a Rhode Island permit have no such luxury. The
totality of federal commercial fisheries regulations suggests that legal transit of the EEZ
is impossible without a federal permit.
Federal regulations pertaining to fishing vessels in the EEZ are a product of
Fishery Management Plans produced by eight Regional Fishery Management Councils
for their respective portion of the EEZ and implemented by NOAA Fisheries Service. For
commercial vessels in Rhode Island, the problematic regulation at issue is 50 C.F.R. §
648, which governs the federal fisheries of the northeastern United States. An initial
reading of the regulation suggests that only fishing without a federal permit is prohibited,
but a further reading of the regulation suggests that simple possession is prohibited as
well.
Section 50 C.F.R § 648.14 covers general prohibitions for the fisheries of the
northeastern United States and declares it is unlawful for a person to:
Possess, import, export, transfer, land, or have custody or control of any
species of fish regulated pursuant to this [Part 648] that do not meet the
minimum size provisions in this part, unless such species were harvested
exclusively within state waters by a vessel not issued a permit under this
part or whose permit has been surrendered in accordance with applicable
regulations.29
28
29

25-8-4 R.I. CODE R. §10.10.
50 C.F.R. § 648.14(a)(7).
7

This language appears to permit a state licensed vessel to cross the EEZ in violation
specific federal regulations provided that the vessel fished only in state waters. The
difficulty here would be for the vessel operator to demonstrate that the species were
harvested exclusively within state waters. The prohibition section also includes specific
provisions for vessel and operator permits, which state that it is unlawful for a person to:
Fish for, take, catch, harvest or land any species of fish regulated by this
part in or from the EEZ, unless the vessel has a valid and appropriate
permit issued under this part and the permit is on board the vessel and has
not been surrendered, revoked, or suspended.30
Here, there is a federal license requirement for fishing within the EEZ, but no specific
requirement for possession of a species within the EEZ. Under this provision, a state
licensed vessel would still be able to cross the EEZ to reach state waters. However, while
50 C.F.R. §§ 648.14(a)(7) and (b)(1) do not appear to prohibit possession of a species
without a federal permit, other statutory provisions imply and expressly require that a
vessel operator possess a federal permit in the EEZ.
While the issue is one of possession, federal regulations do not clearly
differentiate between instances of “fishing” and instances of mere possession. A “fishing
trip” means “a period of time during which fishing is conducted, beginning when the
vessel leaves port and ending when the vessel returns to port.”31 Therefore, the fact that
648.14(b)(1) does not explicitly prohibit possession without a license is moot, because
“fish for” would include the entirety of the voyage, including the time the vessel’s gear
was not deployed and the vessel was merely transiting the EEZ. Read in this light, it is
apparent that both sections 648.14(a)(7) and (b)(1) simply reaffirm the principle that
states are free to regulate their territorial waters and make no allowances for state
licensed vessels in federal waters.
Federal regulations for specific species support this proposition. For example, the
North East Multispecies permit, which allows for harvest of a variety of groundfish, is
expressly required if the vessel is in possession of one of the species within the EEZ. The
regulation reads:
Except for vessels that have been issued a valid High Seas Fishing
Compliance permit, have declared their intent to fish, and fish exclusively
in the NAFO Regulatory Area as provided in § 648.17, any vessel of the
United States, including a charter or party boat, must have been issued and
have on board a valid multispecies permit to fish for, possess, or land
multispecies finfish in or from the EEZ.32
Similarly and for a single species, the requirements for harvest of summer flounder state
that:

30

50 C.F.R. § 648.14(b)(1).
50 C.F.R. § 648.2.
32
50 C.F.R. § 648.4(a).
31
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Any vessel of the United States that fishes for or retains
summer flounder in the EEZ must have been issued and
carry on board a valid summer flounder permit, except for
vessels other than party or charter vessels that observe the
possession limit set forth in § 648.106.33
For species for which possession is banned under federal law such as Atlantic salmon, it
is illegal to use any vessel to fish for the species, with the strict presumption that “the
Atlantic salmon on board were harvested in or from the EEZ, unless the preponderance of
reliable evidence available indicates otherwise.”34
From a recreational standpoint, the issue is whether differences in state and
federal rules would put recreational fishermen at risk during transits between areas of
state waters. Unlike state commercial permits, state recreational licenses are often
afforded reciprocity in federal waters. For instance, Rhode Island’s saltwater recreational
license, “applies in all offshore federal waters, which extend seaward from the seaward
edge of all state waters.”35 Moreover, federal regulations state, “a state licensed
recreational fishing vessel may transit the EEZ provided that “the State's laws and
regulations are consistent with the fishery management plan and applicable Federal
fishing regulations for the fishery in which the vessel is operating.”36 It follows that if
federal rules pertaining to size season and catch limits are more restrictive than that of the
state, the vessel cannot legally proceed through the EEZ. In situations where a species is
closed in federal waters, but open in state waters, the vessel must also defer to the Federal
regulation. This rule is essentially the reverse of the “most restrictive rule” pertaining to
federal vessels transiting state waters.
In Rhode Island, as in much of the northeast, recreational fishermen regularly
encounter species such as black sea bass, bluefish, cod, haddock, lobster, pollock, scup,
striped bass, summer flounder, tautog, and weakfish.37 Within the federal waters of Block
Island Sound, a state licensed recreational fishing vessel faces potential liability for
possession of a species not satisfying federal season, size, possession limits. Currently,
the only instances federal regulations more restrictive than Rhode Island regulations are
for possession of black sea bass, scup and winter flounder. While also a potential
liability, regulations resolved the issue of striped bass as discussed below.
For black sea bass, federal and Rhode Island size and possession limits are the
same, but the respective fishing seasons are incongruent. For the EEZ and Rhode Island
waters, a recreational fisherman is unable to retain a black sea bass less than 13 inches

33

50 C.F.R. § 648.3(b).
50 C.F.R. § 648.14(h)(1).
35
Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management, Division of Fish & Wildlife
Recreational Saltwater Fishing License Information, available at http://saltwater.ri.gov/
(last visited February 1, 2013).
36
16 U.S.C.S 1856(a)(3)(a) (LexisNexis 2013).
37
A chart including every species is attached below.
34
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and can posses up to 15 fish per person.38 The federal season runs from January 1st to the
end of February, and then from May 19th to October 14th, and from November 1st to
December 31st.39 The state season runs from June 15th to December 31st. A Rhode Island
recreational fisherman would therefore be unable to cross the EEZ from Block Island
from October 14th to November 1st. For scup, Rhode Island catch limits increase from 20
per person between May 1st and August 31st to 40 per person between September 1st and
October 31st. During the 40 per person time period, a recreational fisherman is in
violation of the federal regulation mandating a 20 per person catch limit for the entire
year.40
For winter flounder, federal possession is banned south and east of Cape Cod,
while Rhode Island permits possession of 2 flounder per person of 12 or more inches in
most areas below Narragansett Bay.41 Possession of winter flounder within the EEZ by a
Rhode Island recreational fisherman would therefore be banned.
While federal regulations ban possession of striped bass in federal waters as well,
an exception makes an allowance for possession within the EEZ surrounding the waters
of Block Island. This possession exception arose out of a showing that the enforcement of
the no possession rule was unduly onerous, difficult to enforce, and that state licensed
vessels had no choice but to traverse the EEZ. The striped bass exception appears to be a
workable solution to the issue of difficulties in regulatory compliance while transiting
federal waters, but the length of the process involved suggests that attempting the same
on a per species basis may not be the most efficient solution to compliance issues.
For striped bass, taking, retaining, or possessing a federally protected species in
federal waters is illegal under federal rules meant to conserve the species.42 In 1989
NOAA Fisheries solicited public comment on options presented to regulate fishing for
striped bass in the EEZ on the Atlantic Coast.43 NOAA posited four options: (1)
prohibition on the harvest and the possession of striped bass in the EEZ; (2) prohibition
on the harvest of striped bass in the EEZ; (3) application of state regulations to fish
caught in the EEZ; and (4) status quo or take no action.44
NOAA Fisheries’ proposed rule prohibited a person to “Possess any Atlantic
striped bass on board a fishing vessel while such vessel is engaged in fishing within the

38

50 C.F.R. § 648.145(a) (2013) (Black sea bass Possession Limit); 50 C.F.R. § 648.147
(2013) (Black Sea bass Minimum fish sizes); 25-8-4 R.I. CODE R. §7.14.2 (Black Sea
Bass Recreational Harvest).
39
50 C.F.R. § 648.146 (2013) (Black sea bass Recreational Fishing Season); 25-8-4 R.I.
CODE R. §7.14.2-2 (Recreational Season).
40
50 C.F.R. § 648.128(a) (2013) (Scup Possession Restrictions); 50 C.F.R. § 648.127
(2013) (Scup Recreational Fishing Season).
41
50 C.F.R. § 648.86 (2013) (NE Multispecies Possession Restrictions); 50 C.F.R. §
648.81 (2013) (NE Multispecies Closed Areas); 25-8-4 R.I. CODE R. §7.8 (Winter
Flounder Recreational Regulations).
42
Atlantic Striped Bass Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C.S. §§ 5151-5158 (LexisNexis 2013).
43
Atlantic Coast Striped Bass Regulations in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 54 Fed. Reg.
33735 (August 16, 1989) (Advance notice of proposed rulemaking).
44
Id.
10

EEZ.”45 In a public comment to the rule, both the New England Fisheries Management
Council (NEFMC) favored Option 4, noting the need to transport Atlantic striped bass
that were legally taken in state waters through the EEZ (such as in the waters of Block
Island Sound).46 Disregarding NEFMC’s objection, NOAA Fisheries decided that an
outright ban with no exceptions was more practicable.47
The Mid Atlantic Fisheries Management Council supported the proposed rule, but
suggested that possession of Atlantic striped bass on a vessel in the EEZ while the vessel
is not engaged in fishing be allowed only in the area between Block Island and the Rhode
Island mainland.48 The Coast Guard commented that prohibiting possession would be
very difficult to enforce and suggested that possession of Atlantic striped bass be
prohibited on a vessel unless that vessel is in continuous transit from one location in state
waters to another location in state waters.49 In response, NOAA limited the exception to
the Rhode Island area because the only location where a fisherman can take Atlantic
striped bass legally in state waters and must traverse the EEZ en route to the mainland is
Block Island, Rhode Island.50 The Prohibitions and Block Island Sound area exceptions
were consolidated and clarified in 1996.51 There, NMFS consolidated regulations
pertaining to the Atlantic striped bass and weakfish fisheries, which were contained in
two C.F.R. parts, into a single part.52 In a final action, NMFS responded to U.S. Coast
Guard suggestions to clarify current language and address enforcement issues by defining
the Block Island Sound Area through GPS coordinates.53
All told, it took 7 years for the NMFS to construct an exception to allow
possession of striped bass by recreational fishermen in a small area of the EEZ, provided
the vessel remained in continuous transit. The difficulty in applying an exception such as
this on a per species basis is not only the time involved, but also the regularity of which
state and federal fisheries regulations can change. Constant change means updating
transiting exceptions on a per species basis becomes a continuous and needless burden;
therefore the “striped bass exception” is likely not the model for which to base any future
exceptions unless the exception contains a broader base more able to withstand future
changes.
Regardless, the current state of affairs for recreational fishermen is that when
fishing vessels have no choice but to cross federal waters in order to return to port with
their catch, federal regulations distinguish between commercial and recreational vessels.
45

Id.
Id.
47
Id.
48
Atlantic Striped Bass Fishery, 55 Fed. Reg. 40181 (October 2, 1990) (Final Rule, 50
C.F.R. 656).
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Atlantic Striped Bass Fishery; Atlantic Coastal Fisheries Cooperative Management;
Consolidation and Revision of Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 29321 (June, 10, 1996) (50
C.F.R. §§ 656, 697).
52
Id.
53
Atlantic Coast Weakfish Fishery; Change in Regulations for the Exclusive Economic
Zone, 62 Fed. Reg. 24921 (September, 22, 1997) (50 C.F.R. § 697).
46
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Commercial vessels are unable to transit federal waters due to permit requirements
whereas recreational vessels may transit provided federal regulations are not more
restrictive than those of the state. While individual transit provisions aid recreational
vessels where a species is heavily regulated under federal law, drafting individual
provisions for all the instances where federal regulations are more restrictive would be an
inefficient solution to this complex problem.
III. Extensions of State Fisheries Jurisdiction
Complex coastlines result in incongruous fisheries management schemes likely to
confuse and frustrate fishing vessel operators. One solution to this problem is to allow for
allows for state management of fisheries in federal waters in instances where state waters
nearly or totally encompass federal waters. This part of the paper discusses the
“Nantucket Sound exception” contained within the language of the Magnuson Act, which
allows Massachusetts to exert fisheries jurisdiction over the whole of the Sound. This part
of the paper then discusses the applicability of the Nantucket Sound Exception to the case
of Rhode Island, which has a similar opportunity to enclose the federal waters of Block
Island Sound for the purpose of establishing state fisheries jurisdiction.
Nantucket and Vineyard Sounds are subject to the fisheries jurisdiction of
Massachusetts under the Magnuson Act.54 The Magnuson Act expressly authorizes
Massachusetts' exercise of regulatory authority over the harvesting and at-sea processing
of fish in Nantucket and Vineyard Sounds.55 Pursuant to the Magnuson Act, “The
jurisdiction and authority of a state shall extend . . . with respect to the body of water
commonly known as Nantucket Sound, to the pocket of water west of the seventieth
meridian west of Greenwich.”56 This extension of jurisdiction arose to address the limited
situations where federal waters were entirely surrounded by state waters.57 Addressing
these limited situations, Congress allowed for the extension of state jurisdiction because
“the presence of these pockets creates incongruous fishery management schemes and
presents significant problems in the area of fisheries law enforcement.”58 While
Nantucket Sound is not entirely enclosed by the territorial sea of Massachusetts, it creates
the same fisheries management problems that §1856 of the Magnuson Act alleviates.59
Rhode Island could seek enclose Block Island Sound for the purpose of fisheries
jurisdiction as a result of the same fisheries management problems Massachusetts faced.
On the face of the statute, Block Island Sound is not a candidate for exemption under 16
U.S.C. § 1856(a), which applies to “any pocket of waters that is adjacent to the State and
totally enclosed by lines delimiting the territorial sea…”60 However, like Nantucket
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Sound, Block Island Sound creates “incongruous fishery management schemes and
presents significant problems in the area of fisheries law enforcement,” the situation for
which Congress designed the section.61
While Block Island Sound is similar to Nantucket Sound in that the federal waters
are not entirely enclosed, Block Island Sound is open in to the greater federal waters in
two different locations rather than one. This makes an argument for expanded state
jurisdiction more persuasive because vessels fishing in state waters off of Nantucket
Island could conceivably take a “great circle” route around the bay until it reached
Chatham Harbor, the whole time avoiding entering federal water. Here, vessels fishing
off of Block Island must traverse the EEZ en route to the mainland. In this way, partial
enclosure of federal waters by those of the state presents greater difficulties for fishermen
than do nearly or totally enclosed state waters.
Unlike the Nantucket Sound Exception, H.R. 3906 (To Amend the Atlantic
Striped Bass Conservation Act) sought to extend Rhode Island fisheries jurisdiction over
federal waters for a single species. Here, it would appear that any extension of
jurisdiction for a single species would have to demonstrate that modification of current
no possession requirements are insufficient, that enclosure is consistent with federal
management and conservation issues and that enclosure would not undermine regulatory
efforts in other states.
Modification of no-possession requirements is sufficient for the area of federal
waters lying between Block Island and the mainland (“Block Island Transit Zone”). The
Striped Bass Management Board of the ASMFC and the New England Fishery
Management Council noted in 1990 the need to transport Atlantic striped bass legally
taken in state waters through the EEZ where possession was illegal. The proposed rule62
accommodated this by allowing a recreational vessel to transport Atlantic striped bass
through the EEZ, provided that person does not engage in fishing while in the EEZ.63
H.R. 3906 is also inconsistent with current management principles, executive
orders, and could undermine regulatory efforts in other states.64 In 1990, NMFS
implemented a federal ban on the harvest and possession of striped bass. In 2006, NMFS
reanalyzed potential effects of opening the EEZ to Atlantic striped bass harvest and
received overwhelming support for continuation of the ban. In 2007, an Executive Order
affirmed as policy of the United States the goal of conserving striped bass and NMFS
determined that the current prohibition on fishing for striped bass in the EEZ was
consistent with the executive order.65 Critics argue that granting exceptions to the rule
will give way to further exceptions in other states, rendering piecemeal the overall federal
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conservation effort detailed above.66 Finally, the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries
Commission (ASMFC) is cautious about expansion of harvesting opportunity, such as
opening federal waters, without an analysis of the impacts on the overall harvest and the
stock status. In a hearing on H.R. 3906, the ASMFC stated, “given the choice between
the painful measures taken to rebuild the fishery or regulatory adjustments to sustain a
stock at a sustainable level of biomass, our states choose the latter.”67
A wholesale extension of Rhode Island fisheries jurisdiction over the waters of
Block Island Sound appears more likely to be successful than a piecemeal approach. Such
extensions have already proven successful in Massachusetts, are based on federal law,
address a specific problem and avoid concerns over the breakdown of uniform
applicability of federal fisheries regulations.
IV. Extensions of State Sovereignty
While Massachusetts resolved the issue of excessively intervening federal waters
within Nantucket Sound through an extension of state fisheries jurisdiction, New York
accomplished the same in Long Island Sound through an extension of sovereignty. Where
federal waters excessively intervene upon those of a state, annexation of the federal
waters is proper only when the state demonstrates that the body of water satisfies the
statutory, treaty, and jurisprudential requirements for annexation. While Block Island
fulfills the definition of a juridical bay under the Submerged Lands Act and Article 7 of
the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (1958
Convention), current Supreme Court jurisprudence suggests that Block Island Sound
would not be enclosed as a juridical bay.
Under the 1958 Convention, a bay is a “well-marked indentation” that is “more
than a mere curvature of the coast;” the area of which area is “as large as, or larger than
that of a semi-circle whose diameter is a line drawn across the mouth of that indentation”
and where islands divide the mouth of the indentation, the semi-circle is “drawn on a line
as long as the [sum] of the lengths of the lines across the different mouths.”68
However, the Supreme Court has held that nothing in the 1958 Convention or in
the Submerged Lands Act of 1953 indicates whether islands may be treated as extensions
of the mainland for the purpose of forming a headland of a juridical bay. 69 In some
circumstances, an island or group of islands may be considered part of the mainland and
therefore treated as headlands if they are so integrally related to the mainland that they
66
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are realistically parts of the coast within the meaning of the 1958 Convention.70 Whether
a particular island is treated as part of the mainland depends size, distance from the
mainland, depth and utility of the intervening waters, shape of the island, and relationship
to the configuration or curvature of the coast.71 An island's "origin and resultant
connection with the shore" is also considered.72
The 1958 Convention is the applicable law in all disputes between the United
States and the individual states in regard to coastal boundaries.73 In U.S. v. California, the
Court held that “the meaning of ‘inland waters’ in the Submerged Lands Act should
conform to the Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.”74 The
Submerged Lands Act gives control over the water and submerged land resources within
three miles of the baseline to each individual coastal state.75 Taken together, the
Submerged Lands Act grants states territorial waters extending three nautical miles, the
baseline for which depends on the interpretation of the 1958 Convention.
The 1958 Convention contains both a subjective and objective test for juridical
bays. The objective test provides a straightforward mathematical formula while the
subjective test requires a determination of whether the indentation in the coast is
sufficiently bay-like. This subjective determination acts as a roadblock to most claims
raised by states, as the Supreme Court and its special masters confront complex
geography deemed insufficiently bay-like, resulting in a growing body of factors used to
determine whether an indentation that otherwise meets the objective test is actually a
bay.76 In the matter of Rhode Island’s Block Island Sound, the Supreme Court held that
despite meeting the objective requirement of Article 7, Block Island could not be treated
as an “extension of the mainland” and thus could not be as headlands of a juridical bay.77
The holding remains fundamentally at odds with Article 7, which accounts for the
geography of Rhode Island and New York.
Article 7 of the 1958 Convention requires a bay to be a “well marked
indentation.” Here, the coastline of the mainland of Rhode Island, Connecticut and New
York would otherwise fail Article 7’s requirement. However, the drafters of the 1958
convention intended to include indentations created in part by islands to be included as
juridical bays under Article 7, which includes an “indentation which, if it had no islands
at its mouth, would not fulfill the necessary conditions, is to be recognized as a bay.
Given this allowance for bays formed in part by islands, Long Island and Block Island
create a well-marked indentation that when taken together with the mainland, forms a
well-marked indentation.
Contrary to the 1958 Convention, the Supreme Court held in the U.S v. Maine
that “the Convention addresses the problems created by islands located at the mouth of a
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bay, but does not address the analytically different problem whether islands may be
treated as part of the mainland to form an indentation.”78 Instead, an island or group of
islands may be considered part of the mainland if they are so integrally related to the
mainland that they are realistically parts of the "coast" within the meaning of the 1958
Convention.79 Applying this standard, the Court deemed Long Island so integrally related
to the coast that it could be “assimilated to the mainland.”80 In doing so, the Court cited
the proximity of Long Island to the mainland at its western-most tip, the shallowness and
inutility of the intervening waters, the fact that the East River is not an opening to the sea,
[as well as] common geological history, formed by deposits of sediment and rocks
brought from the mainland by retreating glaciers.81 In contrast, Block Island lacked
proximity to the mainland and lay outside what was otherwise a proper closing line
running north from Montauk Point.
Despite the Court’s disregard of Article 7, Block Island should have succeeded
under the “assimilation of the islands to the mainland test.” Like Long Island, Block
Island shares a common geological history with the mainland. Both islands formed what
was once a continuous piece of land that contained a large freshwater lake.82 As glaciers
retreated, a major water gap formed between Long Island and Block Island and flowed
toward the sea.83 Later, sea currents widened the gap between the islands as sea levels
rose, resulting in the current geological formations.84 Additionally, commercial vessels
rarely go between Montauk Point and Block Island because of the hazardous underwater
conditions there and often use Block Island Sound as a refuge because of the calmer
waters there.85 Despite these conditions and despite what appears to be an allowance by
the drafters of the 1958 Convention, it seems that solely due to Block Island’s greater
distance from the mainland, Block Island Sound did not pass the Court’s subjective
interpretation of a “well marked indentation.”
Article 7 also requires a bay to be “as large or greater than the area semi-circle
with a diameter equal to the closing lines across the mouths of the bay.” Here, the first
closing line measures from Montauk Point to a point near Southwest point on Block
Island. The second closing line measures from Sandy Point on Block Island to Point
Judith on the Rhode Island Mainland. The total distance is approximately 22 miles.86 A
semi-circle with a diameter of 22 miles has an area of approximately 190 miles. Long
Island Sound measures 1,320 sq. miles and Block Island Sound measures 250 sq. miles.87
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The bay constituting the two sounds measures 1,570 sq. miles, which is greater than the
required 190 miles and so satisfies the Article 7 test. Here, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that under this test alone, Block Island Sound constitutes a juridical bay.88
The issue therefore came down to the proper application of the more subjective
requirements of Article 7, noted above.
The drafters of Article 7 also intended to account for the presence of islands
across the mouth of the indentation, even though the closing line would, without the
island, exceed the distance requirements laid out above. The drafters note that “Here, the
Commission's intention was to indicate that the presence of islands at the entrance to an
indentation links it [the indentation] more closely with the territory, which may justify
some alteration of the proportion between the length and depth of the indentation.”89
Despite this, the Supreme Court claimed, “such a treatment of islands beyond the natural
entrance points of an indentation finds no support in the Convention or in any of the
scholarly treatises.”90 In discounting such islands, the Court held that the island should be
“close enough at all points to provide [a seaman] with shelter from all but that one
direction.”91 In this way Block Island Sound fails the test for a juridical bay on the
Supreme Court’s theory that it will not treat islands deemed well beyond the natural
entrance points of an indentation as creating multiple mouths to that indentation.92
The Supreme Court’s sentiment that Block Island is too far removed from the
coast to constitute the headlands of a bay does not seem related to the statutory
requirements for designating a state’s internal and territorial waters. By the Court’s own
admission, the interplay between the Submerged Lands Act and the 1958 convention
should define a state’s territorial waters. Allowing for the enclosure of Long Island
Sound while forbidding the same for Block Island Sound, regardless of the fact that both
bodies of water satisfy the requirements, needlessly complicates fisheries regulatory
compliance and enforcement both for Rhode Island and the federal government.
Conclusion
Rhode Island’s issue of excessively intervening federal waters within Block
Island Sound remains while neighboring bodies of water display a variety of solutions
that have resolved the very same fisheries jurisdictional issues arising from complex
territorial waters. Past efforts to assert state sovereignty over intervening federal waters
have failed and more recent efforts to assert at least some state fisheries jurisdiction over
federal waters never got off the ground. As a result, the current state of affairs remains a
maze of competing and superseding federal and state fisheries regulations. Vessels
operating under federal permits must either abide by more restrictive state regulations or
may challenge the state regulation under the Rhode Island Supreme Court’s outlying
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preemption jurisprudence. State permitted recreational fishing vessels may transit the
federal waters of Block Island Sound provided that the catch on board satisfies federal
regulations more restrictive than those of the state or is exempted from federal regulation.
Commercial vessels wishing to do the same are left out in the cold. While seemingly
unique to Rhode Island, the same competition between federal and state regulation exists
wherever islands sit greater than six miles offshore.
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